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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Brandon Ritchie appeals, pro se, from the district court’s order denying his
petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court set forth the relevant factual and procedural background of this
case, as follows:
[Ritchie’s] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief relates to the sentences
imposed in Ada County Case Numbers CR-FE-2015-15946 and CR-FE2015-13886. In case -15946, Petitioner was charged with one count of
grand theft (I.C. § 18-2403) and one count of criminal possession of a
financial transaction card (I.C. § 18-3125). In case -13886, Petitioner was
charged with two counts of burglary (I.C. § 18-1401) and two counts of
petit theft (I.C. § 18-2403). On December 23, 2015, in case -15946,
Petitioner pled guilty to one count of grand theft and the remaining charge
was dismissed pursuant to plea bargain negotiations. On December 31,
2015, in case -13886, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of burglary and
the remaining charges were dismissed pursuant to plea bargain
negotiations. Petitioner signed written guilty plea advisory forms in both
cases. Both cases were consolidated with this Court prior to sentencing.
On February 25, 2016, in case -15946, Petitioner was sentenced to 10
years with the first two years fixed and the remaining eight years
indeterminate. Also on February 25, 2016, in case -13886, Petitioner was
sentenced to 10 years with the first three years fixed and the remaining
seven years indeterminate, set to run consecutive to the sentence imposed
in case -15946. The Judgments of Conviction and Commitment were both
filed on February 26, 2016. On April 6, 2016, Petitioner filed Rule 35
Motions for Reconsideration of Sentence in both cases. The Rule 35
Motions were denied on April 20, 2016. Petitioner did not file any appeals
in either case.
Thereafter, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
on April 24, 2017, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for not
ensuring the Court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent sentences and for
misinforming Petitioner that he could only pursue a Rule 35 Motion or a
direct appeal, but not both.
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(R., pp.27-28.) Contemporaneous with his petition (R., pp.4-10), Ritchie filed a motion
for appointment of counsel (R., pp.19-20).
The district court denied Ritchie’s motion for the appointment of counsel, as it
found Ritchie’s claims could not be “developed into viability even with the assistance of
counsel.” (R., p.28.) The district court also issued its notice of intent to dismiss Ritchie’s
petition, finding that Ritchie’s claims were frivolous, and that “as presently constituted,
this Petition raises no genuine issues of material fact.” (R., p.28.) The court further
found that because the petition was filed on April 24, 2017—more than a year after the
expiration of time for appeals in the underlying cases—the petition was time-barred under
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a). (R., p.28.) The district court accordingly gave Ritchie “20
days to supply a brief or further supporting affidavit reciting why he believes his Petition
is not barred by the statute of limitations,” and warning that without such a response, “the
Court will dismiss the Petition without further notice.” (R., pp.28-29 (emphasis in
original).)
Ritchie responded with a “Brief in Opposition of Court’s Notice to Dismiss &
Denial of Appointment of Counsel.” (R., pp.31-32.) Regarding the statute of limitations,
Ritchie argued his petition was timely because “[o]n April 6, 2016, petitioner filed a
‘Rule 35 Motion’ on both cases asking the court to reconsider.” (R., p.31.) Ritchie
appeared to argue the Rule 35 motions stayed or otherwise extended the statute of
limitations, and his petition was therefore timely.

(See R., p.31.)

Regarding the

substance of his claims, Ritchie contended that they were not frivolous because “[t]he
facts which are supported by the petitioner[’]s affidavit, leave[] a question of fact that
only a jury can decide.” (R., pp.31-32.) Ritchie further argued that “[t]he State of Idaho
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also violated the post-conviction reform act, as they failed to respond [to the petition]
within 20 days as required by law.” (R., p.32.)
The district court dismissed the petition. (R., pp.33-44.) It noted first that “[t]he
Court of Appeals has specifically held that the limitations period for filing an application
for post-conviction relief is not extended by the filing of a Rule 35 motion,” and therefore
the petition was untimely irrespective of Ritchie’s Rule 35 motions. (R., p.38 (citing
Hanks v. State, 121 Idaho 153, 155, 823 P.2d 187, 189 (Ct. App. 1992).) The district
court went on to find that “[e]ven if the Petition were not untimely, Petitioner’s claims
fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact that would entitle him to an evidentiary
hearing.” (R., p.39.) The court noted Ritchie’s guilty plea, and found the petition
“recited no factual allegations and supplied no evidence that the advice to plead guilty
was in any way unsound or caused him any prejudice.” (R., p.40.) The court found that
“[t]here are no genuine disputes of fact concerning (at a minimum) the prejudice prong of
Strickland v. Washington 1,” all of which necessitated a dismissal. (R., p.40 (footnote
added).)
Lastly, the district court noted that “[t]he law is well settled that the State’s failure
to file an answer or otherwise respond to a Petitioner’s Petition does not automatically
entitle the Petitioner to relief.” (R., p.41 (citing State v. Beorchia, 135 Idaho 875, 879, 26
P.3d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 2001).) The court found that because it “framed the factual and
legal issues” in its notice “and gave the Petitioner the opportunity to respond … the
timeliness of the State’s response is rendered moot.” (R., p.41.) The court concluded

1

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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there were “no genuine issues of material fact” entitling Ritchie to post-conviction relief,
and dismissed the petition with prejudice. (R., pp.41, 43.)
Ritchie filed a motion for reconsideration. (R., pp.45-56.) In it, he “propose[d]
another excuse” for considering his petition timely: Ritchie averred that he filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus on June 24, 2016; that “[t]he Court could have considered the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief but declined
to do so”; and that, “[i]f the Court would’ve considered it as such, the Petition would’ve
thereby been filed timely.” (R., pp.47-48.) Ritchie also renewed his claim that counsel
was ineffective, and requested leave to amend his petition and “provide more concise
details and physical evidence to support this claim.” (R., p.50.)
The district court entered an order denying Ritchie’s motion for reconsideration.
(R., pp.57-61.) Regarding timeliness, and the alleged effect of a habeas corpus filing on
this case, the district court pointed out that “[t]his Court did not preside over any habeas
corpus proceeding.” (R., p.59.) Moreover, “[Ritchie’s] argument that the present Petition
should be deemed timely filed by virtue of a habeas corpus proceeding fail[s] and
ignorance of the law is no excuse for an untimely petition.” (R., p.59.)
The district court also found Ritchie’s petition continued to fail on the merits:
Petitioner next asserts that the Court should allow him the opportunity to
amend [his] Petition to allege the following non-frivolous claims—his
counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of his constitutional due
process rights, his counsel misinformed him as to his appeal options and as
a result Petitioner was under the impression that a Rule 35 motion would
stay proceedings, [and] his counsel should have filed a direct appeal.
Petitioner’s claims are bare and conclusory and are clearly contradicted by
the record of the proceedings in the underlying matters. Even if the
Petition were not untimely, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on any of his
claims. Petitioner’s assertions are contradicted by the Guilty Plea
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Advisory Forms he signed under oath. He was advised at length of his
constitutional rights and he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
waived those rights when he pled guilty. Petitioner’s complaints relate to
the length of the sentence he received (consecutive as opposed to
concurrent), rather than the conduct of his lawyer. Petitioner has recited
no factual allegations and supplied no evidence that the advice to plead
guilty was in any way unsound or caused him any prejudice, given the
extensive benefits provided to him through the plea bargain balanced
against the considerable risk of proceeding to trial. There are no genuine
disputes of fact concerning (at a minimum) the prejudice prong of
Strickland v. Washington. Accordingly, the Court did not err in dismissing
his Petition. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED.
(R., pp.59-60.)
Ritchie timely appealed from the judgment dismissing his petition. 2 (R., pp.6264.)

2

At first glance, Ritchie’s November 14, 2017 notice of appeal does not appear timely
from the district court’s August 28 order and judgment dismissing the petition. (R., p.3.)
However, based on the mailbox rule, it appears that Ritchie’s motion for reconsideration
was mailed on August 22, within 14 days of the judgment (despite its file-stamp date of
August 30) (R., pp.45, 55-56), which would have extended the time for Ritchie to file his
notice of appeal. See State v. Yeaton, 121 Idaho 1018, 1019, 829 P.2d 1367, 1368 (Ct.
App. 1992) (“Idaho Appellate Rule 14 provides that the time for appeal from a ‘criminal
judgment, order or sentence’ can be extended by the filing of a motion within fourteen
days of the judgment.”)
5

ISSUE
Ritchie’s opening brief does not contain a “short and concise” statement of the
issues on appeal, as required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4). (See generally “Brief” (hereinafter
“Appellant’s brief”).) The state phrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Ritchie failed to show the district court erred in denying his meritless,
untimely motion for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
Ritchie Fails To Show The District Court Erred By Dismissing His Untimely, Meritless
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Ritchie appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his petition for post-

conviction relief. As best can be gathered, he appears to raise three 3 essential issues
before this Court: 1) claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his guilty
plea and his Rule 35 motion in the underlying criminal case; 2) a claim that the state
violated his due process rights by not responding to his petition for post-conviction relief;
and 3) a claim that his petition was timely filed. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.1-2.)
Ritchie fails to show any error. The district court correctly dismissed Ritchie’s
petition for post-conviction relief because it was untimely, and in any event, meritless.

B.

Standard Of Review
Summary dismissal is appropriate where the petitioner’s evidence raises no

genuine issue of material fact. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802
(2007). On review of a summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, “this Court will
determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and
admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe the facts and
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Id. at 523, 164 P.3d at 803.

3

These claims are set forth as issues 1, 3, and 4 in the Appellant’s brief, respectively.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp.1-2.) It is difficult to discern the precise claims in Ritchie’s
issue 2; however, it appears that issue 2 raises similar claims of ineffective assistance.
This brief will therefore analyze Ritchie’s issues 1 and 2 as encompassing his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on appeal.
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C.

Ritchie’s Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Was Plainly Untimely And
Therefore Properly Dismissed
Petitions for post-conviction relief must be filed “within one (1) year from the

expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later.” I.C. § 194902(a). Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motions—unless filed within fourteen days of the entry
of judgment—do not stay or otherwise extend the time period for filing an application for
post-conviction relief. See Hanks v. State, 121 Idaho 153, 154-55, 823 P.2d 187, 188-89
(Ct. App. 1992) (“It would be contrary to the legislative intent of I.C. § 19–4902 to set a
definite time limit upon challenges to convictions and sentences were we to allow the
limitation period to be extended by the filing of a Rule 35 motion, when the denial of a
Rule 35 motion is not itself reviewable under the Uniform Post-conviction Procedure
Act.” (footnote omitted)).
The district court correctly dismissed Ritchie’s petition for being untimely. (R.,
pp. 38-39, 59.) In Ritchie’s underlying case, the judgments of conviction were filed on
February 26, 2016. 4 (R., p.39.) Ritchie had 42 days—until April 8, 2016—to file an
appeal from those judgments. I.A.R. 14(a). Thereafter, Ritchie had another year—until
April 8, 2017—to file his petition for post-conviction relief. I.C. § 19-4902(a). Ritchie

4

It appears that Ritchie’s underlying criminal cases are not part of the record of this case
on appeal. (See R., p.63 (requesting this Court include in the record or take notice of the
Clerk’s Record in CV-HC-2016-11611, an apparent state habeas corpus case, but not
making any such request regarding the underlying criminal cases).) However, the facts
necessary to resolve the issues in this appeal—including the date of the entry of
judgments—are set forth in the district court’s orders in this case. (See, e.g., R., pp.2728.) Regarding the timeliness claim, Ritchie has not contested the district court’s
dispositive factual findings: that the judgments were entered on February 26, 2016, and
that he filed his petition on April 24, 2017. (R., p.34; see generally, Appellant’s brief.)
8

did not file his petition until April 24, 2017, 16 days past the statute of limitations. (R.,
p.4.) His petition was therefore clearly time-barred and subject to dismissal for that
reason alone, as the district court correctly concluded.
To date, Ritchie has not overcome the statute of limitations that barred the filing
of his petition. Below, he alleged that the filing of Rule 35 motions would stay or
otherwise extend his deadline, but per Hanks, this is incorrect. 121 Idaho at 155, 823
P.2d at 189 (refusing “to allow the limitation period [for filing a petition for postconviction relief] to be extended by the filing of a Rule 35 motion”). Ritchie’s other
theory below—that “the Court could have considered the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus,” filed in a separate proceeding, as a stand-in for a timely petition in this
proceeding—was unsupported by any legal authority and properly rejected. (R., pp.48,
59.)
On appeal, Ritchie contends that “the district court was in error by dismissing” the
petition on timeliness grounds, but continues to fail to support this argument with any
argument or authority. (Appellant’s brief, p.2.) This Court holds pro se litigants “to the
same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney,” Golay v. Loomis, 118
Idaho 387, 392, 797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990), and those standards require appellants to
support their claims with coherent argument and authority. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho
259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Ritchie has not supported his timeliness claim with
any authority, much less shown that the district court “was in error.” (Appellant’s brief,
p.2.)
The district court was not in error. Ritchie’s petition was untimely. The district
court properly dismissed it for that reason.
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D.

Even If Timely Filed, Ritchie’s Petition Failed To State A Viable Claim Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Idaho’s Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act authorizes summary dismissal of

a petition for post-conviction relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the
court’s own initiative, “when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits
submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” I.C. § 19-4906. A district court considering summary
dismissal must construe disputed facts in the petitioner’s favor, but it is not required to
accept conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner’s
conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App.
1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986).
To show a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
satisfy a two-prong test and show both that 1) “counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness,” and 2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-95 (1984). A reviewing court’s
“scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential”; therefore, “a court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. Accordingly, counsel’s tactical and
strategic decisions “will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based
on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of
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objective evaluation.” Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App.
1994).
Ritchie’s petition alleged his counsel gave ineffective assistance of counsel in two
essential ways: by “not holding the [sentencing] Court to the agreed plea agreement,” and
by “lying to the petitioner” regarding the filing of a Rule 35 motion and/or appeal. (R.,
p.5.) The only alleged facts in the record to support these claims are found in Ritchie’s
affidavit in support of his petition:
3) Ada County public defender, Charlene W. Davis lied to me as I plead
[sic] guilty to all counts as I was promised they would be ran concurrent,
4) Charlene W. Davis, told me that I either could do a rule 35 or Appeal,
but not both….
(R., p.9.)
Even if Ritchie’s petition had been timely, the district court correctly dismissed
Ritchie’s claims for failing to raise a genuine issue of material fact showing ineffective
assistance of counsel. (See R., pp.39-40, 60.) Construing disputed facts in Ritchie’s
favor, Ritchie’s claims were nevertheless “bare and conclusory,” as the district court
found. In particular, claims that Ritchie’s attorney “lied” to him simply assumed a
conclusion—even granting the attorney made “promises” about sentencing outcomes, or
gave advice about post-plea options, does not mean the attorney was lying about eventual
outcomes or available procedures, as opposed to just being incorrect.
Moreover, the district court relied on ample findings that contradicted Ritchie’s
claims of ineffective assistance surrounding the plea: it found that Ritchie “freely and
voluntarily” completed the Guilty Plea Advisory form; that he “knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently” waived certain constitutional rights “when he pled guilty”; and that
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“Petitioner has recited no factual allegations and supplied no evidence that the advice to
plead guilty was in any way unsound or caused him any prejudice, given the extensive
benefits provided to him through the plea bargain balanced against the considerable risk
of proceeding to trial.” (R., p.60.) As such, the district court found, “[t]here are no
genuine disputes of fact concerning (at a minimum) the prejudice prong of Strickland v.
Washington.” (R., pp.40, 60.)
On appeal, Ritchie fails to show the district court’s factual findings or legal
conclusions were erroneous. He renews his conclusory claim that he “was led to believe
that he was only allowed to put in a rule 35 OR an appeal when he was sentenced.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.1.) However, Ritchie does not go on to allege, much less show, that
his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or that
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for” the alleged errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. (See generally, Appellant’s brief.) Nor does he
overcome the “highly deferential” standard of review, which requires reviewing courts
indulge a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” (See generally, Appellant’s brief.)
Similarly, while Ritchie claims that his “[defense] attorney allowed the district
court to breach a written contract,” he does not state what the attorney did, or what the
contract said, or what the breach, exactly, was. (See Appellant’s brief, p.1.) This claim
therefore fails for lack of support. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970.
Finally, Ritchie claims that “[i]f the defendant would have had proper assistance
of counsel, he would have filed the appeals that were legally allotted to him.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.1.) Even construing this vague claim in a light most favorable to
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Ritchie—as alleging that counsel ignored or otherwise thwarted an attempt to file an
appeal—this claim nevertheless fails under the relevant legal standard set forth in Roe v.
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477-80 (2000) (holding counsel “has a constitutionally
imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal” where there was reason to
think a defendant would want an appeal, or where the defendant indicated to counsel he
was interested in appealing). Here, Ritchie has not alleged facts showing that he asked
his attorney to file an appeal, or expressed an interest in appealing to his attorney, or that
his attorney otherwise should have known that he wished to file an appeal. (See R., p.9.)
Thus, even charitably construing this as a Flores-Ortega claim, Ritchie has failed to show
a viable claim on the merits.
Reviewing the entirety of the record, the district court correctly concluded that
Ritchie failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel. Ritchie fails to show any error
on appeal.

E.

Ritchie Fails To Show The State Violated His Due Process Rights By Not
Responding To His Petition
With no citation to authority, Ritchie argues that the state “failed to respond to the

defendant[’]s petition for post conviction [relief], which is a violation of the defendant’s
due process rights.” (Appellant’s brief, p.2.)
This claim fails from the outset because Ritchie has not supported it with any
propositions of law, authority, or argument. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970.
It also fails because Ritchie makes no attempt to explain how the district’s court denial of
this claim below (see R., p.41) was erroneous. Stewart v. Sun Valley Co., 140 Idaho 381,
384, 94 P.3d 686, 689 (2004) (“Error is never presumed on appeal and the burden of
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showing it is on the party alleging it.” (quotations omitted)); Farrell v. Board of Com’rs,
Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 390, 64 P.3d 304, 316 (2002) (appellant carries burden of
showing error on record and error never presumed). Lastly, this claim fails on the merits;
the state is unaware of any controlling authority holding that the state’s failure to respond
to a frivolous post-conviction petition—which was dismissed only after the court issued a
notice of intent to dismiss—would violate the petitioner’s due process rights. The district
court correctly denied this claim.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Ritchie’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 26th day of April, 2018.

/s/ Kale D. Gans__________________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 26th day of April, 2018, served two true
and correct paper copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing the
copies in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
BRANDON RITCHIE
IDOC #91229
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P. O. BOX 70010
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KALE D. GANS
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